Social
Ethnomethodology's Program* On the way to my room it occurs to me that I should have said that ethnomethodology is respecifying Durkheim's lived immortal, ordinary society, evidently, doing so by working out a schedule of preposterous problems.
The problems have their sources in the worldwide social science movement. They are motivated by that movement's ubiquitous commitments to the policies and methods of formal analysis and general representational theorizing and by its unquestionable achievements.
Formal Analytic (FA) technology and its results are understood worldwide. Almost * Acknowledgements: There are many people whose contribution to this work need to be acknowledged, not least those many students and colleagues whose ethnomethodological studies have provided the catalogue of investigations, discussed here, without which the original promise of "Studies" would have remained unfulfilled.
Ethnomethodology is after all, and necessarily, an unrelievedly empirical enterprise. I thank also Doug Maynard and Lucy Suchman for their steadfast friendship and for their generosity with their time and their hard won knowledge in shoptalk. I am deeply in debt to Anne Rawls. Years ago she was briefly my student. Now she is my teacher, esteemed colleague, and rare friend. She sustained our discussions through the writing and took the time to carefully edit this manuscript for publication.
Because of many people who have taken up an interest in ethnomethodology it is impossible that one description will encompass the vast array of studies going by that name. However, I hope that there is room in this discussion for those studies which take the importance of witnessable recurrent phenomenal fields of detail seriously and as a primary issue, in whatever other respects That these achievements are unquestionable is assured by being subordinated to FA's premier achievement, the corpus status of its bibliographies. By corpus I mean (1) its investigations, always accompanied by textual accounts that describe, specify, make instructably observable, satisfy, and are exhibits of adequate grounds of further ' It is the workings of the traffic that make its staff available as "typical" drivers, "bad" drivers, "close in" drivers and anything else the demographers need to have to administer a causal account of the driving. Endogenous populations are a topic of recurring ethnomethodological interest. You don't start with bodies. The Conversational Analysis of talk provides another example. It starts with conversation which exhibits its speakers as typical recurring, doing it again in the same way, staff. Ethnomethodology (EM) is proposing and working out "What More" there is to the unquestionable corpus status of formal analytic investigations than formal analysis does, did, ever did, or can provide. EM does not dispute those achievements. Without disputing those achievements as unquestionably demonstrable achievements2 EM asks "What More" is there that users of formal analysis know and demand the existence of, that FA depends upon the existence of for FA's worksite-specific achievements in carefully instructed procedures, that FA uses and recognizes everywhere in and as its lived worksite-specific practices.
There are practices that FA practitioners just in any actual case know and recognize are unavoidable, without remedy or alternatives.
The practices are indispensable to practitioners. Just as in any actual case the practices 2 If this claim is read as irony, it will be read incorrectly. To read it without irony, recall the scene in lonesco's Rhinoceros. The last man and his girlfriend, Daisy, are looking out into the street below filled with rhinoceroses. Daisy exclaims, "Oh look, they're dancing." The last man: "You call that dancing!" Daisy: "That's the way they dance."
Similarly, no disrespect is involved for FA's demand that its investigations be worldly work of finding out and specifying real order, evidently; real order, not cockamamie real order. Real order is FA's achievement, without question. EM is not claiming to know better. But neither is EM proposing to institute and carry out EM investigations of ordinary society while being in the midst of organizational things and therein knowing nothing. Rather, we'll proceed without having to decide or even to know how to proceed while knowing nothing. Instead, by [beginning] , by [carrying on], by [finding our bearings again], by [completing an investigation] we'll land ourselves in the midst of things. Procedurally we know something. We're not agnostic. EM's commitments are the same as those of FA in worldwide analytic studies of practical action and practical reason: In the midst of its endless things we'll study the work as of which immortal ordinary society consists. We'll see. specify practitioners' work and make it instructably observable.
"What More" has centrally (and perhaps entirely) to do with procedures. I have given procedural EM's emphasis on work. By procedural, EM does not mean process. Procedural means labor. That emphasis is exemplified in the probative descriptions by David Sudnow. At the worksite-playing hearably improvised jazz at the piano keyboard; typing watchably thoughtful words at the typewriter keyboard; enactedly solving the problem, at the computer console, of getting a high score in "Breakout," the video gameprogressively and developingly coming upon the phenomenon via the work in and as of the unmediated details of producing it (Sudnow, 1978 (Sudnow, , 1979 (Sudnow, , 1983 (Sudnow, , 1996 .
The central obsession in ethnomethodological studies is to provide for what the alternate procedural descriptions of achieved and achievable phenomena of order-methodologies-could be without sacrificing issues of structure. That means without sacrificing the great achievements-of describable recognizable recurrencies, of generality, and of comparability of these productions of ordinary activities -activities that carry with them the recognizable achievements of populations that staff their production, along with the interchangeability and surveyability of those populations. This is not an indifference to structure. This is a concern with structure as an achieved phenomenon of order.
EM is concerned with "What More," in the world of familiar, ordinary activities, does immortal, ordinary society consist of as the locus and the setting of every topic of order, every topic of logic, of meaning, of method respecified and respecifiable as the most ordinary Durkheimian things in the world.
Ethnomethodology's fundamental phenomenon and its standing technical preoccupation in its studies is to find, collect, specify, and make instructably observable the local endogenous production and natural accountability of immortal familiar society's most ordinary organizational things in the world, and to provide for them both and simultaneously as objects and procedurally, as alternate methodologies.
The identity of objects and methodologies is key. These methodologies are incarnate in familiar society. Therein they are uniquely adequate to the phenomena whose production they describe substantively, in material de-tails. The competence of their production staffs consists of the unique adequacy of methods. The competence of their production staffs is, it exists as, it is identical with, the unique adequacy of methods.3 EM addresses these provisions as empirically adequate descriptions. It carries them out by eschewing the methods of formal analysis. This is done without loss or sacrifice of issues of structure, and without bowdlerizing or ignoring issues of structure or changing the subject. 
There Is Order in the Plenum
According to the worldwide social science movement and the corpus status of its bibliographies, there is no order in the concreteness of things (Garfinkel, 1988) . The research enterprises of the social scientific movement are defeated by the apparently hopelessly circumstantial overwhelming details of everyday activities-the plenum, the 3 The unique -adequacy requirement of methods is explained briefly in Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992. plenty, the plenilunium. To get a remedy, the social sciences have worked out policies and methods of formal analysis. These respecify the concrete details of ordinary activities as details of the analyzing devices and of the methods that warrant the use of these devices.
They respecify the sheer circumstantiality of ordinary activities so that order can be exhibited analytically. It is essentially an empirical demonstration. The details found in the model reveal the essential recurring invariant features which are FA's phenomena.
A Catalog of Ethnomethodological Investi-gations4 consists of evidence to the contrary.
Indeed, there is order in the most ordinary activities of everyday life in their full concreteness, and that means in their ongoingly procedurally enacted coherence of substantive, ordered phenomenal details without loss of generality.5 It has to do with the unexplicated specifics of details in structures, in recurrencies, in typicality, not the details gotten by administering a generic description.
These details are unmediatedly experienced and experienced evidently.
Just-in-any-actual-case immortal ordinary society is a wonderful beast. Evidently and just in any actual case, God knows how it is put together. The principal formal analytic devices currently in hand, of paying careful attention to the use, the design, and administration of generic representational theorizing-models, for example, get a job done that with the same technical skills in administering them lose the very phenomenon that they profess. Enacted specifically ordinary organizational phenomena in ordered phenomenal details of structures evidently are strange.
A Catalog of EM Investigations with Which to
Immortal, ordinary society is strange.
Strange? In particulars, what's so strange?
What is strange is already well known and available.
Consider that immortal ordinary society evidently, just in any actual case, is easily done and easily recognized with uniquely adequate competence, vulgar competence, by one and all-and, for all that, by one and all it is intractably hard to describe procedurally. Procedurally described, just in any actual case, it is elusive. Further, it is only discoverable. It is not imaginable. It cannot be imagined but is only actually found out, and just in any actual case.6 The way it is done is everything it can consist of and imagined descriptions cannot capture this detail. Just in any actual case it is both vulgarly done and intractable when it comes to making it instructable. Absent that, and God knows how it is put together. More to the point of strange: In God's silence, formal analysts, by exercising the privileges of the transcendental analyst and the universal observer, do not know; yet still somehow they know they need not hesitate to say.
More on "strange." How immortal, ordinary society is put together includes the incarnate work by formal analysts of paying careful attention to the design and administration of generic representational theorizing. It is no news that that work is an enacted detail of the immortal society it learns about and teaches. In the social science movement the jobs of descriptive analysis get done with generic theorizing. The skills with which these jobs are done are everywhere accompanied by curious incongruities. These are well known, and even freely acknowledged, they include that with the same procedural skills of carrying out these jobs the phenomena they so carefully describe are lost.
Further, the procedure of generic representational theorizing puts in place of the enacted witnessable detail of immortal ordinary society a collection of signs. The FA procedure ignores the enacted, unmediated, directly and immediately witnessable details of immortal ordinary society. Then, analysts have only one option, in order to carry through their 6 For a deep explication of that claim see Schegloff, 1987. analytic enterprises, these being the careful enterprises of description that will permit the demonstration of the corpus status of ordinary actions; in order to do that, analysts become interpreters of signs. Following through consistently with this procedure, it is then argued that interpretation is unavoidable. That designing and interpreting "marks, indicators, signs, and symbols" is inevitably what sociologists and social scientists must do in order to carry out the corpus status of their studies of ordinary activities.
EM is not in the business of interpreting signs. It is not an interpretive enterprise. Enacted local practices are not texts which symbolize "meanings" or events. They are in detail identical with themselves, and not representative of something else. The witnessably recurrent details of ordinary everyday practices constitute their own reality. They are studied in their unmediated details and not as signed enterprises.
Is it then that ethnomethodology in its concerns with "What More" is critical of formal analytic investigations? Is it that ethnomethodology is one more in a familiar line of academic sociology's in-house critics, stirring the waters the better to fish therein? There have been authors of ethnomethodological studies whose reputations were promoted by offering to the members of the worldwide social science movement ways of upgrading their craft. "Your science is cockeyed. We need to sit down and diagnose for you just where you're going wrong." Ethnomethodology has yet to deliver promised repairs to formal analytic social scientific enterprises without losing its own phenomena.
Ethnomethodology is not critical of formal analytic investigations. But neither is it the case that EM, and that means A Catalog of EM Investigations, has no concern with a remedial expertise and has nothing to promise or deliver. Ethnomethodology is applied ethnomethodology. However, its remedial transactions are distinctive to EM expertise.
That expertise is offered for phenomena whose local, endogenous production is troubled in ordered phenomenal details of structures. EM does not offer a remedial expertise that is transcendental to these phenomena. In these the generality of EM's remedial expertise is indifferent to (independent of) the use of policies of generic representational theorizing and methods of constructive analysis to specify the generality of remedial expertise.
Having been found out, EM's findings are described with the questions "What did we do? What did we learn? More to the point, what did we learn, but only in and as lived doings, that we can teach? And how can we teach it?" EM's findings are tutorial problems. They are not different than pedagogies.
They were learned in settings in which teaching and learning being done in concert with others were locally and endogenously witnessable by and "relevant to the parties."
In these respects they were essentially unavoidable and without remedy. Flatly, none of EM's questions are concerned with who is ahead in a contest between rival claims to adequate science in the social sciences. Instead, and just as flatly, the two disciplines, FA and EM, are both and simultaneously incommensurably different and unavoidably related. What do the two technologies have to do with each other? This is EM's prevailing question. This question is the center of EM's bibliographies.
Formal Analytic Literatures and Their

EM Alternates
A collection of EM investigations establishes and specifies, by making instructably 7 Careful, spelled with an asterisk refers to descriptions that are available at the worksite to misreading as the first segment of an instructed action. This is explained further in 3.1 the Praxeological Validity of Instructed Action. 8 The following is an explicating phrase for the "praxeological validity of instructed action": at and as the worksite misreading a description as instructably the work of following which exhibits the phenomenon that the text describes. in an actual investigation one is found, the other is also found. Wherever the ground is analytically trampled, its specific ethnomethodological alternate is findable. The more heavily the ground has been trampled, and wherever it has been trampled for the longest time, the more certainly will its EM alternate be findable. When it is found, the more curious is its prior absence in mainstream literatures, for its absence is a positive phenomenon and an accomplishment of immortal ordinary society not less than are those described by FA investigations.9
In order to describe FA literatures and their Durkheim's aphorism is taught to graduate students from the first day of graduate work:
"The objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle." The aphorism is taken very seriously in both programs of investigations and by both technologies of analysis, FA and EM. Their takes are different; they are incommensurably different. Nevertheless they are inextricably related. For one thing-one organizational thing, and a social fact in its own right-they are asymmetrically alternate.13
That means that you can use ethnomethodology to recover in phenomenal ordered details-in a phenomenal field of ordered details the work that makes up, at the worksite, the design, administration, and carrying off of investigations with the use of formal analytic practices. You can't do it the other way around. That is to say, you can't use the methods of formal analysis to recover the work and the findings that ethnomethodology is coming up with. So their takes on Durkheim's aphorism indeed are not only t2 Jorge Louis Borges talks about a "The Library of Babel." We learned in graduate school that it is a free democracy of theories. You pick up whatever you need.
13 The EM Catalog describes this and other relations in a collection of "rendering theorems." See Garfinkel and Weider (1992) . alternate; they are asymmetrically alternate, and that they are asymmetrically related is itself a social fact.
In the contemporary worldwide social science movement, "The objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle" is understood procedurally, although not as procedurally is understood in ethnomethodology. In the countless analytic arts EM also accords the aphorism heavy procedural emphasis, but distinctively so.
Ethnomethodologically the aphorism is understood like this. From the outset of its investigations, EM addressed various settings of immortal14 ordinary society whose particu-14 Immortal is borrowed from Durkheim as a metaphor for any witnessable local setting whose parties are doing some human job that can range in scale from a hallway greeting to a freeway traffic jam where there is this to emphasize about them: Their production is staffed by parties to a standing crap game. Of course the jobs are not games, let alone a crap game. Think of freeway traffic flow in Los Angeles. For the cohort of drivers there, just this gang of them, driving, making traffic together, are somehow, smoothly and unremarkably, concerting the driving to be at the lived production of the flow's just thisness: familiar, ordinary, uninterestingly, observably in and as observances doable and done again, and always, only, entirely in detail for everything that detail could be. In and as of the just thisness (the haecceities) of driving's details, just this staff are doing again just what in concert with vulgar competence they can do, for each another next first time; and it is this of what they are doing, that makes up the details of just that traffic flow: That although it is of their doing, and as of the flow they are "witnessably oriented by" and "seeably directed to the production of it," they treat the organizational thing as of their doing, as of their own doing, but not of their very own, singular, distinctive authorship. And further, for just this cohort, it will be that after they exit the freeway others will come after them to do again the same familiar things that they-just they-just these of us as drivings doings are in concert doing.
Immortal is used to speak of human jobs as of which local members, being in the midst of organizational things, know, of just these organizational things they are in the midst of, that it preceded them and will be there after they leave. It is a metaphor for the great recurrencies of ordinary society, staffed, provided for, lar staffs so concerted their activities as to exhibit topics of order* as their activities' Studies of many and various subjects concerned with the workings of organizational things, with or without their availability in FA literatures, were done while eschewing the policies and methods of formal analysis.
Each investigation, for its empirical adequacy, described practices that are recognized by practitioners as doable, done, true, "relevant to the parties,"22 and even versimilitudi- Their program was notable for working out and demonstrating the condition of EM adequacy: that the analyst's ethnomethodological findings be taken seriously in the FA discipline that was studied. By being "taken seriously" I mean that at the worksite, practitioners will demand of EM findings just as they demand of FA findings that they satisfy the worksite-specific, disciplinespecific corpus status of FA investigations, and that EM findings be incorporated in FA work at hand or reasons be given for not doing so.
A Collection of Pairs
The following is a list of FA/EM pairs that [1] Stacy Burns provides a specific ethnomethodological alternate. She describes the gap in conventional studies of lawyers' work in law school training. After reviewing well-known social science studies of law school training, she writes: "These conventional studies broadly outline, but are ultimately independent of, the detailed What is reported in the social scientific, educational, and jurisprudential literature leaves largely unaddressed many matters of central practical concern, relevance, and consequentiality to law professors and their students . [2] Calvin Mooers' "Zatocoding" and "Catalogs" respecify descriptions, rules, definitions, glossaries, schemas, instructions, instructed actions, actions as a rule, purposive actions, ends-means schemata, procedural accounts, operational definitions, context, science, oracular reason, divination . . .
In 1952 Calvin Mooers, at the time a recent graduate of MIT, had designed and needed to sell and service to engineering firms his "Catalog" and "Zatocoding" system for the storage and retrieval of small libraries of valuable documents. He described, with marvelous delicacy of experiential specifics gathered from his jobs of selling and installing his system and helping members of client firms to make it work, that and just how context, practical action, categorizing phrases, reasons, search prescriptions, relevance, identity, definitions, glosses, and glossaries were renegade topics.
Mooers' clients were engineers. "Context" was an omnipresent renegade topic in their in-house discussions about the Zatocoding system and in, about, and as their actual in-course work of naming documents, describing, filing, searching for relevant texts but not being able or not wanting to prespecify what it would have to look like before it was found; or finding just what they needed and discarding it as garbage; or so naming, filing, searching, and recovering documents that their company library in any of these ways of operating in it and with it would, to their work satisfaction, have incorporated their developing and changing interests.
A user of the dictionary would select an itemized string of descriptors as a search prescription. Upon the completion of a search, the documents that dropped had to be examined to learn what grammatic readings the items could be found to have. The examinable coherence of a first collection was often deliberately temporary, undertaken just to see where it would lead. Was the document relevantly a document that the prescription had been directed to find? These and densely affiliated other "relevancies" could not be prespecified. Context as a locally occasioned, instructably achieved, repeatedly and collaboratively achieved, and achievable local phenomenon by and for a firm's particular gang was indispensable to assure the locally occasioned, locally achieved efficacy as instructably reproducible recurrencies of worksite practices in details of storage, numbers of documents, the "Catalog," all together with the "Zatocoding" procedure-as an in vivo worksite achievement, just in any actual case.
From 1952 until 1976 the Mooersian catalog was used to add and procedurally specify rules, rule-governed activities, indexical expressions, objective expressions, rational decision making in commonsense situations of choice, glossing as a way to talk plain English, methods, schemes of details, propertied classes of objects, and structure-structure in the way its use collects, and seeks to exhibit about practical action, details in patterns, generality, comparability, typicality, standardization, uniformity, coherence in accordance with the logic of inductive inference, and the existence copula "is" in the senses "there exists" and "is identical with." These are the map's very own territorial organizational things. As territorial objects in a phenomenal field, the map's properties of order* are chiasmically chained to the traveling body's way-finding practices; they are made available to those practices, as those practices.
The map library at UCLA has a list of sketch maps that the Department of Defense publishes, called landing maps, approach maps, horizon maps, etc. From the point of view of embodied traveling, they must put in the hands of the troops ways of recognizing an actual shoreline so that they minimize their casualties. The maps have this occasioned character not because they are faulted, but because they are used.
Occasion maps are analytic cartography's stepchildren. Formal analytic studies of occasion maps have missed these phenomena entirely. With the same careful technical policies and methods with which formal analytic studies have described occasion maps, these phenomena are lost.
<4> A fourth topic of formal analysis includes scientific demonstrations such as Galileo's inclined plane demonstration of the 27 "Salience" is used in an EM respecification of Gurwitsch's (1964) result; that is, the "coherence of a group of data." He obtained this finding in his transcendental phenomenological criticism of the gestalt theory of form.
28 "Identifying" is misleading. I'm using it as a collector for other members of its family that are also misleading for EM studies-e.g., definitional, essential, genetically essential, paradigmatic, criterial, primitive, primordial, primary, schema, ideal, ideal type, Uhr-thisand-that, etc. "Identifying" is a temporary place holder for the work it describes when it is respecified ethnomethodologically. For the time being I am using it as a natural language descriptor. It alludes to the work it is used in vivo to describe. No one needs to be inevitably misled.
real motion of free-falling bodies in the literatures of science studies. It also includes models and analogies in the natural sciences, such as Rasmussen's use of maps to describe the development of methods in electron microscopy (Rasmussen, 1994) and studies of work in the natural sciences.
[4] In the phenomenal-field properties of Galileo's inclined-plane demonstration of the [real motion]29 of free-falling bodies, the achieved coherence of objects has very much to do with naturally accountable work.30 So do Louis Narens' "right hand" and "left hand" paths from instructions to the demonstrated [real motion] of freefalling bodies, described as S/T2 = K.
"There's a gap in the literature" in science libraries. I made inquiries first to several librarians in the physics library at UCLA, and, when they couldn't help, to the library director. Were there descriptive materials available whose adequate pedagogic relevance consists in that and in the way that they specify the first and second segments of Lebenswelt pairs?3' These would be materials that are pedagogically relevant to teaching's worksites in physics. Were any materials available? Could any be found for any of physics teaching's worksites, from introductory labs for undergraduates to arcane settings of collaborating professional faculty? After he showed me several volumes and described several others, and after he listened to my reasons why they were not what I was looking for, the director replied, "There's a gap in the literature." <5> Gestalt phenomena: Themes, topics, subjects, demonstrations, in gestalt psychology conatitute an important FA literature: gestalt illusions, figural alternates in experimental perception (e.g., "ambiguities"), CAD models and modeling. A classic FA study was that of Heider and Simmel (1944) , who, in order to study the psychology of person perception, developed a movingpicture film of 2 1/2 minutes' duration with various geometric figures (including a large triangle, a small triangle, and a circle) that 29 Square brackets in bold, [ ], mark off an EM procedural account of the phenomenon that is described with the name in the enclosed brackets. moved around a space also occupied by a stationary rectangle. They asked subjects to view the film and answer questions such as "What kind of person is the big triangle (little triangle, circle)?" and they asked subjects to tell the story of the movie in a few sentences.
In their analysis of subject's answers, Heider and Simmel proposed that subjects saw the figures in the movie in terms of distal stimuli that were mediated according to more proximal features of the field in which those stimuli were embedded. In his own book His study is a propaedeutic case for a collection of FA investigations that come "so, so close" and lose the phenomenon. Maynard suggests that "within Heider's account are indications of how subjects actually perceive, not according to relatively inert and extrasensuous stages and variables that accord stimuli some transcendental meaning, but, perception occurs according to in situ, sensuously-produced, functional significations formed between the geometric figures, their parts, and additional constituents whose presentation unfolds in time as time itself is produced through the procedures of actors. Subjects see one thing preceding another and the other succeeding the one, thereby assembling a chronology out of an inextricably inner or endogenous order that then informs and is informed by just what a geometric figure might be as a type of person" (Maynard, 1995) .
Indexing the classic gestalt domain of illusions and figural alternates in experi-"there could be "more" to those processes glossed by the terms perception, consciousness, cognition, etc. In a classroom context, working with gestalt figures, perception and its production cannot be separated from public descriptions that students and professors produce and attend to as joint courses of action. In embodied tellings of their seeings members bring into being "panels-of-a-cube," "fronts," "backs," "tallness," "width,"6 "depth," "alternating configurations." These emerge in and as temporalized narratives enacted both through talk and through the body's gestures that concertedly model and rehearse visualizations as classroom-specific accomplishments" (Maynard, 1995) . Also, EM's "Heideggerian" uses of incongruities of bodily impairments and brain injuries and illnesses are perspicuous in revealing the ("hidden") transparent work of achieved coherence. Therein, DOT entries are sources for well-known advisories that serve across studies of work and occupations as analytic ethnographic detailing devices: e.g., "goal oriented behaviors," "context-dependence," "rational problem solving," "local settings," "tacit knowledge," "skills," "the village versus the city." Course bibliographies offer technical guides to their existence and correct use in established topics of university departments and professional schools. 1) It was news that and just how an "etcetera clause" can be used to provide according to local occasion, for completeness and generalizability in a collection of rules. It can be used as well to provide for other properties of rules-e.g., followability, sufficiency, ideality of meaning, factual adequacy, universality, necessity, and any of the rest. Distinctive investigations in the EM catalog of achieved radical phenomena of order* bear particularly and uniquely on instructions and instructed actions. Cases of instructed actions from the EM catalog have been described in games-with-rules; in a game with rules, the completeness of its collection of basic rules; in any case of rule-governed actions, the completeness of a collection of rules; in the Mooersian catalog; in formatting in queues; in the local, occasioned, endogenously achieved properties of logic, reason, method, and structure of occasion maps; in EM pairs; in Lebenswelt pairs; and in the praxeological validity of instructed actions. In the EM catalog these are propaedeutic cases with which to emphasize, with studies of instructed actions, the enormously prevalent and commonplace skill of praxeologizing descriptive accounts.
Praxeologizing Descriptive Accounts
In endlessly many disciplines, as local occasion demands, practitioners are required to read descriptive accounts alternately as instructions. They do so occupationally, as a skilled matter of course, as vulgarly competent, specifically ordinary, and unremarkable worksite-specific practices. These are chained bodily and chiasmically to places, spaces, architectures, equipment, instruments, and timing. Within a discipline, practitioners require such competence of each other, not exclusively but centrally just in any actual case, and then unavoidably and without remedy, passing, evasion, or postponement. When occasion calls for a division of work, practitioners can be found to concert their efforts to assure a praxeological reading its recurrent, smooth, uninterrupted achievement by the culturally and organizationally local staff of its production.
The EM catalog examines, as astronomically, massively prevalent work, various ways in which an account that is readably descriptive-say diagrammatically, or as freeway signing, or as wall announcements, or in the prose of declarative sentences-can be read alternatively so that the reading provides for a phenomenon in two constituent segments of a pair: 1) the-first-segment-of-a-pair, which consists of a collection of instructions; and 2) the work, just in any actual case of following which somehow turns the first segment into a description of the pair.32 32 I emphasize of the pair. This is in contrast to a common and even hackneyed use that would read this passage like this: Following instructions somehow turns them-i.e., the disengaged and disengageable instruc- It is with these later interests and with these tions-into a description of following them. See Livingston (1986) .
later analytic formats that topics and themes of instructed actions are collected and come to focus in EM studies respecifying the natural sciences as discovering sciences of practical action.
Conditions of adequacy in EM investigations are used in each of these to respecify FA's formats, < > and [ ], and their relations. By "adequacy conditions" is meant that EM investigations, in each of the groups, ask "What did we do? What did we learn?":
(i) What did we learn that is other than what FA does, did, ever did, or can provide?
(ii) What did we learn that FA recognizes as massively and unavoidably prevalent and available to FA in worksite-specific details?
(iii) What did we learn that FA depends upon the existence of for FA's worksitespecific achievements, for FA's pride of profession and technical stock in trade of instructably observable adequate professions of worldliness and reality, and for the instructably observable corpus status of its bibliographies?
(iv) What did we learn that FA uses and recognizes EM everywhere in and as its in vivo worksite-specific practices? These are practices that FA practitioners just in any actual case know and recognize are unavoidable, without remedy, and without alternatives. The practices are indispensable to practitioners, and practitioners demand them. Just in any actual case the practices identify FA practitioners' work, they are known to FA's practitioners, and are recognized by them to be that. In all these respects the practices are specifically uninteresting to practitioners and are ignored. Known to practitioners and recognized by them in all these respects, the practices are known to and recognized by them categorically.
And, FA practitioners, being deeply careful in endless enterprises that for FA's various disciplinary reasons must make the adequacies of their achieved professions of worldliness and reality instructably observable in generically theorized structures of practical action, therein do not know what to do with these practices. EM catalog investigations respecify FA's analytic formats. Each of the different groups of studies does so distinctively with its particular investigations. In each group of studies the practices that are specified EMwise are known to and recognized by FA practitioners; their existence is demanded by them and depended upon; their existence is specified and made instructably observable in, about, as and in established languages, as of worksite-specific competent practices of shopwork and shoptalk; for FA's practitioners they are unavoidable, without remedy, without alternatives; they identify FA competent accounting practices in worksite-specific witnessable detail. And in worksite-specific detail they are specifically uninteresting and ignored.
EM asks: What in the world is so obstinately and relevantly omnipresent? What in the world is so unanimously known and recognized by FA practitioners? Where in the world is it found? And how?
The issue is this: In the entirety of FA's corpus, "What More" is nowhere specified or specifiable. Nor can "What More" to instructions and instructed action be found with FA's methods. Then just what in the world is being looked for? Just what is to be found? Just
where? Just how?
The investigations in the EM catalog offer selected answers to these questions. The answers cover selected perspicuous settings from the EM catalog. What did we do? What did we learn? What can we do? And what can we learn? EM investigations, along with their accompanying EM policies and methods, compose a catalog of tutorial problems. Their epistemological and ontological status is that of a catalog of tutorial problems. These are grounds in EM investigations for replies to these queries.
